INTRODUCTION Over four decades ago, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District announced that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
1 Ever since, courts have struggled to define the limits of those rights, especially when the speech of one student harms another.
2 Subsequent cases carved out doctrinal alternatives and exceptions to Tinker and thereby gave schools more discretion to restrict harmful speech.
3 But these decisions provided little guidance on how much, if at all, Tinker allows schools to restrict student speech in order to protect the physical and psychological well-being of other students. When harmful student speech is not vulgar and offensive, does not bear the imprimatur of the school, and does not advocate illegal drug use, how much can schools limit it?
In recent years, this question has been particularly central to schools' attempts to restrict controversial student speech on race and sexuality. On the one hand, it is clear enough that schools can protect students from verbal bullying or targeted hate speech. 4 On the other hand, it is far less clear-and far more controversial-whether Tinker permits schools to protect students from harmful political, social, or religious speech. Accordingly, lower courts have reached wildly conflicting conclusions about the permissibility of restricting such student viewpoints. Cir. 1972 ) (holding that state university had acted reasonably in prohibiting student athletes from wearing black armbands hostile to other students' religions during a football game).
example, but not necessarily Confederate-flag clothing.
7 Pro-homosexual slogans 8 or pro-heterosexual student speech 9 are protected, but anti-gay speech is not, 10 unless it is simply too mild to be harmful. 11 "Homosexuality is a sin" 12 is permissible student speech, but "Homosexuality is shameful" goes too far.
13
Lower court disagreement has resulted from looking exclusively to Tinker and its progeny for guidance on restricting harmful viewpoints in schools. Tinker originally devised a two-prong test under which schools can restrict student speech only if it "materially and substantially interfer [es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" or "collid [es] with the rights of others."
14 But applying this framework to harmful student speech runs into immediate problems. Is such speech a substantial disruption or an invasion of others' rights?
15 How much speech is needed to trigger either Tinker prong?
16 Does the speech have to be individually targeted, or are broad political statements also proscribable?
17 If a court protects student (holding that school could not prohibit student from saying "I don't accept gays").
12. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (granting preliminary injunction for student to wear a potentially offensive t-shirt so long as no actual or imminent material disruption was likely to occur). 13 . Harper, 445 F.3d at 1182 (holding that school could prevent student from wearing inflammatory T-shirt that violated the rights of other students).
14. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (quotation marks omitted). 15 . Compare Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177-78 (applying "rights of others" prong to Tshirt that read "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL"), with Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1071 (D. Minn. 2001) (applying "substantial disruption" prong to "Straight Pride" T-shirt). For further discussion, see infra notes 167-181 and accompanying text. 16 . Compare Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 676 (holding that "tepidly negative" speech does not trigger Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong), with Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178 (holding that "verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying characteristic" trigger Tinker's rights of others prong), and id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that only speech "so severe and pervasive as to be tantamount to conduct" triggers Tinker's second prong).
17. Compare Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674 (addressing emotional harm or invasion of right to education), with Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (requiring evidence beyond fact that students would likely find speech offensive).
speakers too much, it risks emotional harm to the student audience exposed to the speech; if the school protects the student audience too much, it risks impermissible viewpoint discrimination against the student speakers. Caught between this Scylla and Charybdis, courts have placed different limits on a school's ability to shield students from emotionally harmful speech by other students.
Adopting the same methodology, scholars have only replicated these basic disagreements. They, too, find that schools can prohibit verbal bullying or targeted hate speech.
18 But like lower courts, scholars primarily have mined the Tinker line of cases, alone, to glean how Tinker should apply to harmful political, social, or religious commentary. While some thus have analyzed such speech under Tinker's "material disruption" prong, 19 others have advocated applying the "rights of others" prong; 20 scholars have disagreed over the scope of each prong, too.
21 Occasionally other doctrine has been used, but only to establish that a school can restrict harmful speech, not to consider the boundaries of that authority.
22
What both scholars and lower courts have missed is that the Supreme Court actually situated Tinker and its progeny within a broader jurisprudence on protecting minors from all kinds of harmful speech.
23 That jurisprudence also balanced content or viewpoint discrimination, on the one hand, with a state's compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of 21. Compare Mollen, supra note 19, at 1523-24 (doubting that "substantial disruption" refers to disruption to a single student's ability to obtain an education), with Waldman, supra note 19, at 492-502 (requiring disruption of just one student's educational experience to trigger "substantial disruption"); compare Bilford, supra note 19, at 469 (following Harper but not advocating for expanding its scope), with McCarthy, supra note 20, at 610-11 (expanding "rights of others" even beyond Harper's focus on minorities) 22 minors, on the other. 24 In turn, Tinker and its progeny cited to protectionist cases and applied those rationales to restricting speech in schools.
25 Examining how student speech cases modified this protectionist jurisprudence thus clarifies the limits on a school's ability to protect students from harmful student viewpoints.
Accordingly, this Note takes a fresh look at the problem of harmful student speech through the lens of protectionist jurisprudence. Part I shows how recent decisions have disagreed over whether and how much schools can protect students from harmful speech. These decisions, in turn, have left unresolved a number of key questions about protectionism and viewpoint discrimination in schools. Part II then examines how Tinker used protectionist principles to answer similar questions. I trace how, under Tinker and its progeny, the state's protective authority only expands in the special context of schools: even viewpoint restrictions on speech are permissible in order to protect students from potentially harmful speech.
Parts III and IV then use insights from protectionist jurisprudence to answer the questions left open in Part I. Part III maintains that a school's basic educational mission and the state's compelling interest in protecting minors justify some restrictions on harmful speech in schools. To the extent that such speech invades a student's right to be let alone, it falls under Tinker's "rights of others prong." Still, Part IV shows, there are limits on a school's ability to restrict harmful speech. Schools should not be able to ban racist or homophobic viewpoints automatically, for not all such speech is harmful. Nor should high schools, at least, be allowed to prevent students from voluntarily exposing themselves to those viewpoints in civil discussion. The Conclusion considers how far this rule extends to other types of speech.
I. INCONSISTENT APPROACHES TO HARMFUL SPEECH IN SCHOOLS
Recent lower court decisions have adopted an implicit student welfare standard-what I term protectionism-in student speech cases.
26 But in applying a protectionist standard, lower courts have looked exclusively to Tinker's unclear framework. Accordingly, these decisions have disagreed over how far schools can go to protect students from harmful student speech. Three main views have emerged: I call these, respectively, the institutional rights, expanded institutional rights, and private rights approaches. As will be clear, each applies a different amount of protection for student audiences under one of Tinker's two prongs. The approaches consequently clash over what evidence counts for a reasonable forecast of "substantial and material disruption," for example, or what types of harms collide with the "rights of others."
A. The Institutional Rights View
The least restrictive and least protective approach is the institutional rights view, which frames harmful student speech as a threat only to a school's institutional rights to maintain order and good discipline. Any emotional harm caused is immaterial unless it results in emotional outbursts or provokes a violent reaction-that is, unless it creates material disorder infringing on a school's institutional rights. In short, this view treats emotionally harmful speech like any other kind of student speech under Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong.
Courts have typically adopted the institutional rights approach where a protectionist justification would be redundant. Confederate flag clothing cases, for example, almost always involve material disruptions-prior incidents of racial violence, threats, or tensions-that have justified the restriction on student speech.
27 Likewise, when a school had prohibited students from wearing T-shirts bearing the American flag during its Cinco de Mayo celebration, the Ninth Circuit noted threats of race-related violence in upholding the restriction of speech.
28 Eschewing protectionism in these cases is therefore uncontroversial, for the restriction on speech already passes Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong.
The institutional rights approach has been more controversial in cases involving student speech on sexuality, where there has not already been a material disruption or reasonable threat thereof. There, courts have used the institutional rights approach to shield student speakers-whether expressing pro-gay 29 Board of Education, for example, a high school student won a preliminary and permanent injunction to wear a T-shirt that read in part "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder! Some issues are just black and white!" because there had been no actual disruption, and there was "no evidence of any history of violence or disorder in the school."
31 The Nixon court also found no evidence that the student's "silent, passive expression of opinion" had invaded other students' rights.
32
Eschewing protectionism altogether, the institutional rights approach thus focuses narrowly on material disruptions: violence, emotional outbursts, or physical invasion of other students' rights.
33 By framing student speech in terms of a school's institutional rights, moreover, lower courts adopting this standard tend either to ignore the "rights of others" prong altogether or to interpret it narrowly, as the Nixon court did, along the lines of physically invading others' privacy.
34 As Parts I.B and I.C show, other approaches read Tinker more broadly in order to provide some protection for student audiences.
B. The Expanded Institutional Rights View
The expanded institutional rights view espouses a limited form of protectionism and folds protection for student audiences into Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong. Although a few scholars have welcomed this limited protectionist approach, 35 only two courts have adopted it-most prominently, the Seventh Circuit in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204.
36
In Nuxoll, two high school students won a preliminary injunction to wear a "Be Happy, Not Gay" T-shirt to school in protest of their school' Silence.
37 Note that, because it was less offensive than the unabashed speech in Nixon, the T-shirt in Nuxoll likely would have been permissible under the institutional rights view. The Seventh Circuit likewise permitted the speech, but on protectionist grounds expanded the scope of emotionally harmful speech that the school permissibly could have restricted.
38
Nuxoll also framed the harmful speech in terms of a school's institutional right to maintain an orderly classroom, but the court extended the institutional rights approach in two ways. First, Nuxoll expanded the scope of the "substantial disruption" prong to protect students from emotional and psychological harm in addition to classroom disruption.
39 Second, and also for protectionist reasons, it redefined that prong to encompass disruption of not just a classroom as a whole, but even a handful of students' ability to learn.
40
Nuxoll thus expanded the type of evidence relevant to forecasting substantial disruption: in addition to Nixon's physical disruption (violence, emotional outbursts), schools could point to evidence of a decline in test scores or school attendance.
41 There simply was no evidence of either type to justify restriction of the students' "tepidly negative" T-shirt.
42
Though more protective of emotionally harmed students than the institutional rights view, this approach nevertheless establishes only a limited form of protectionism. The Seventh Circuit virtually read away Tinker's "rights 37 ' connotes, is not a school's only substantial concern."). Judge Rovner, concurring, seemed to adopt Nixon's institutional rights view: the speech, though outright "disparaging," was nevertheless insufficient on its own to create a hostile environment that might materially and substantially interfere with school activities. Id. at 679 (Rovner, J., concurring). 40 . Nuxoll was deeply concerned about the psychological effects of student speech. See id. at 674 ("Imagine the psychological effects if the plaintiff wore a T-shirt on which was written 'blacks have lower IQs than whites'"). The court expressly evaluated Nuxoll's T-shirt in terms of whether or not it tended to "poison the educational atmosphere." Id. at 676. And it equated "symptoms of a sick school" with substantial disruption. Id. at 674. These symptoms included a decline in test scores or absenteeism-which presumably would have affected only certain offended groups or individuals, and not the entire classroom. of others" prong. 43 And by folding psychological harm to students into the "substantial disruption" prong, the court again read the "rights of others" prong narrowly-this time as encompassing only "legal rights." 44 The court concluded that those legal rights simply did not include a "right to prevent criticism of [peoples'] beliefs or for that matter their way of life."
45 Moreover, the court effectively required a strong causal link between the T-shirt and substantial disruption. Despite other incidents of homophobia and harassment of gay students at the school, the court held that a "tepidly negative" T-shirt could not reasonably be forecast to cause similar disruption.
46
In short, the expanded institutional rights view offers some protectionism by expanding the scope of Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong. As the next Part shows, a third approach likewise includes protectionism, but through Tinker's "rights of others" prong.
C. The Private Rights View
The private rights approach offers the most expansive protectionismhence the greatest threat of viewpoint discrimination.
47 It views harmful student speech as a threat not to the school environment, as under both institutional rights approaches, but to the emotional and psychological development of students.
48 By folding protectionism into Tinker's "rights of 43 . Tinker itself created this prong, in part, to protect students from invasive speech. See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text. Note, in this regard, that the kind of speech that might lead to a "decline in students' test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school," is precisely the kind of demeaning speech that might be thought to invade the rights of others. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674. 44 This approach is best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Poway Unified School District, where a high school student sought a preliminary injunction to wear a T-Shirt that read "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front, and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27'" on the back.
49 Under an institutional rights and possibly an expanded institutional rights view, Harper could have prevailed.
50 Indeed, Judge Kozinski took essentially an institutional rights approach in his dissent, under which Harper's shirt did not meet either Tinker prong.
51 Yet under the highly protective private rights approach of the majority, Harper lost.
It is not difficult to see why, given the majority's portrait of students as particularly vulnerable to psychological harm.
52 To protect students, the court expanded Tinker's "rights of others" prong to include the right to be free from "verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying characteristic" while in school.
53 Although the court might have protected all students from such verbal attacks, it distinguished harm to minorities as particularly damaging 54 and questionnaire were to be distributed in school). The Trachtman dissent found that "emotional harm" was far too nebulous and vague an extension of the "rights of others" prong to justify what amounted to "destruction of constitutionally protected free speech rights." Id. at 521 (Mansfield, J., dissenting 51. See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1193-94 (noting that minimal actual disruption and heated discussion did not reach level of "substantial disorder"); see also id. at 1198 (finding that "rights of others" refers only to traditional rights, like assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion, and blackmail).
52. See id. at 1176 ("Generally, [students] are vulnerable to cruel, inhuman, and prejudiced treatment by others."); id. at 1178 ("Public school students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying characteristic . . . have a right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses."); id. at 1179 ("Those who administer our public educational institutions need not tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy the selfesteem of our most vulnerable teenagers . . . .").
53. Id. at 1178. The majority later seemed to narrow its holding only to "speech that strikes at a core identifying characteristic of students on the basis of their membership in a minority group," id. at 1182 n.27, but left open the question of whether a school could similarly ban remarks based on gender, id. at 1183 n.28.
54. Compare id. at 1182 (rejecting a school ban on T-shirts reading "Young Republicans Suck" because they "would certainly not be sufficiently damaging to the individual . . . to warrant a limitation on the wearer's First Amendment rights"), with id. at 1179 (permitting school to ban speech demeaning to gay and lesbian students because it is "detrimental not only to their psychological health and well-being, but also to their amply documented the harm that gay students suffer from anti-gay speech and violence.
55 Similar attacks on someone in a majority still could warrant protection, the court noted, but probably not under Tinker's "rights of others" prong.
56 Part of the concern here was viewpoint discrimination: the majority needed to draw the line somewhere lest a school be permitted to censor all demeaning speech.
57
The private rights approach expands the amount and type of harmful student speech that schools can restrict under either institutional view. First, it does not distinguish between the harm of a hostile environment and that of a single demeaning comment.
58 Lower courts do not usually require evidence linking the student speech to actual emotional harm to other students.
59 Second, the private rights approach does not distinguish between personally directed abusive epithets and political statements. Even "tepidly negative" anti-gay speech, for instance, could be prohibited under Harper's expansive rule.
60
Given their varying views on protectionism, these three broad approaches leave unresolved key questions about applying Tinker to harmful student speech. First, do protectionist principles justify greater restriction of harmful speech in schools? Second, under which Tinker prong should courts analyze such speech-the "substantial disruption" prong or the "rights of others" prong? Third, how much viewpoint discrimination is allowed under either prong? Can a school censor all harmful viewpoints, or must it allow nonpersonally directed political statements? And finally, how stringent should any causation requirement be for restricting harmful speech? Must a school prove that a single student's speech would cause harm, or is it enough that the speech contributes to a harmful environment? educational development"). But see id. at 1200-01 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (querying why other kinds of demeaning speech should not also be proscribable). 55 Harper's minority/majority distinction is arbitrary, I would nevertheless urge strong limits on a school's ability to eliminate any given viewpoint entirely. See infra Part IV.B.
58. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1179 (citing social-scientific literature measuring the impact of abusive speech and violence on gay students); Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that a state university had acted reasonably in prohibiting student athletes from wearing black armbands hostile to other students' religions in one game).
59. See also Williams, 468 F.2d at 1084 (citing no evidence that opposing team, whose religion would have been mocked by the student athletes' armbands, would have suffered harm). Compare Harper, 445 F.3d at 1199 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that "evidence" of harassment's effect on gay students is not actual evidence that this t-shirt would have interfered with gay students' education), with Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that schools are not required "to predict with certainty" how many students would be harmed by sex questionnaire).
60. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185 (allowing schools to discuss tolerance, equality, and democracy, while censoring intolerant, bigoted, and hateful viewpoints).
Courts have struggled to answer these questions largely because they have looked exclusively to Tinker and its progeny for guidance. But as Part II shows, the Tinker line of cases drew on additional jurisprudence on protectionism; examining that jurisprudence sheds light on how far schools can and cannot go to protect students from emotionally harmful speech.
II. PROTECTIONISM IN AND OUT OF SCHOOL
The desire to protect students from anti-gay or racist speech is a recent concern, yet protecting children from harmful speech is nothing new. Since the Victorian era, at least, the state has tried to shield minors from harmful expression, including girlie magazines, offensive television broadcasts, child pornography, and violent video games.
61 Although not all of these attempts have been successful, courts have recognized that the state has a "compelling state interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors."
62 Part II.A examines the reasons for, and limitations on, this state interest in protecting minors from harmful speech. Part II.B then shows how Tinker and its progeny utilized those principles while expanding the scope of protectionist authority within schools.
A. Protecting Minors from Harmful Speech
This Part examines the justifications for and limits of the state's authority to protect minors from harmful speech outside of schools.
63 The seminal case in this area is Ginsberg v. New York, which upheld a New York statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to children under the age of seventeen even though such materials would not have been obscene to an adult audience.
64 protectionism have remained central to protectionist jurisprudence.
65 Those justifications include aiding parents in raising their children as they see fit; safeguarding children from harm that "might prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens"; and, as Justice Stewart added in a concurrence, protecting children where "in some precisely delineated areas" they do not "possess[] of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
66 This Part fleshes out each justification in turn.
Ginsberg noted that parents' authority to raise their children however they want is "basic in the structure of our society."
67 While parental responsibility of their children's well-being is primary, the state can-and Justice Brennan suggested, should-aid parents in that responsibility.
68 The New York statute did just that in regulating only material that community standards would have deemed harmful to minors.
69 Moreover, the statute did not interfere with the parental role, for parents who so desired could still purchase the girlie magazines for their children. Subsequent cases, like Entertainment Merchants, have struck down just such interference where the state has tried to substitute its own judgment for parents' on the kind of speech to which children should be exposed.
70
Ginsberg's second justification was that the state should protect the wellbeing of children to ensure that they develop into free and independent citizens. Ginsberg quoted Prince v. Massachusetts for this proposition, 71 and in both cases the Court applied broad protectionism to protect the moral, physical, and psychological well-being of children.
72 Such protectionism applied only to 71. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640-41 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (upholding child labor law against aunt who let nine-year-old ward publicly distribute copies of religious magazine)).
72. In Ginsberg, this well-being encompassed at least their "ethical and moral development," which exposure to obscenity might impair. 390 U.S. at 641-42. Similarly, Prince pointed to the "crippling effects" of child labor, the "dangers" of the streets for young children, and the harms of "emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury" from children, however: the statutes in Ginsberg and Prince would have been invalid had they also applied to adult audiences.
73 Moreover, this protectionism applied even without clear evidence that the restricted speech would, in fact, harm children. Ginsberg expressly recognized that no evidence had proven a causal relationship between exposure to obscenity and moral impairment.
74
Even so, because obscenity for children was unprotected speech, the majority simply accepted as reasonable the legislative finding that such causality exists.
75
Entertainment Merchants recently clarified that Ginsberg's less deferential approach to causation is appropriate only where the regulated speech is unprotected.
76 Otherwise strict scrutiny is required, including means narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
77 In addition, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of Ginsberg and Prince to an almost exclusive focus on the physical and psychological well-being of children; Ginsberg's concern for moral harm has disappeared.
78 To demonstrate narrow tailoring, the state must show a causal link between the restricted speech and physical or psychological harm to minors.
79 Only sexual speech seems exempt from this causation being a religious martyr that justified prohibiting minors under a certain age from selling magazines in the streets. 321 U.S. at 168-70. 73 . Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638; Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 74 . Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-42 ("While these studies all agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either." (citation omitted)).
75. Id. at 641-43. Likewise, Prince did point to the dangers of child employment and street preaching in general. 321 U.S. at 169. But on the specific harm posed by a child's distributing religious literature in the street, the Court spoke only of tendencies and "harmful possibilities"-never of certain causality. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-70; see id. at 170.
76. 131 S. Ct. at 2735 (distinguishing California statute that did not "adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children").
77. See id. at 2738-39 (holding that California had failed to show any direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989) (holding that prohibition of adult access to indecent but not obscene 'dial-a-porn' service far exceeded what was necessary to limit minors' access to same); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996) (applying narrowly-tailored test). Denver raises, but does not address, the possibility that lower scrutiny might apply where indecent speech is at issue. 518 U.S. at 755.
78. For example, New York v. Ferber justified a New York law prohibiting the promotion of child pornography by a lengthy analysis of the "physiological, emotional, and mental" harms children suffer by participating in pornography. 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982) . Despite the ideal opportunity, Ferber made no mention of any impairment to the moral development of sexually exploited children. See also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (noting that "disgust is not a valid basis for restriction"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (discussing "physical and psychological well-being of a minor"); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (same).
79. See Garfield, supra note 61, at 608-15 (discussing the difficulties in showing empirical causality of harm to children); Ross, supra note 61, at 501-07 (showing how neither violent nor sexual speech meets evidentiary demands).
requirement.
80 Where there is no actual harm to minors, then, the state cannot restrict the speech on protectionist grounds.
81
Ginsberg's third justification for protectionism, taken from Justice Stewart's concurrence, is that children, like a captive audience, sometimes lack the capacity for full choice to hear harmful speech.
82 This captive audience justification stems from the idea that individuals should have some autonomy to ward off unwanted, offensive speech.
83 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, for example, the Court upheld a restriction on artistic speech-a patently offensive comic routine about sex and excretion that may have been protected in other contexts-because it was uniquely accessible to children and uniquely intruded into the homes of unwilling listeners.
84
As Pacifica suggests, captive audiences occur primarily where there are unwanted intrusions into one's home: protests immediately outside a residence, loud noises disturbing a tranquil residential area, or indecent mailings to one's home.
85 But even outside of the home, courts have upheld speech restrictions so long as there was no meaningful opportunity for an unwilling listener to avoid the offensive speech.
86 Conversely, when the listener is indifferent or willing, or when there is no captive audience, the restriction on speech is impermissible. 
89
Although the school had asserted protectionist grounds for removing racist and vulgar books, Pico distinguished between mandatory curricula and students' voluntary enrichment at the library.
90 Under Pico, one final limit on protectionism-perhaps the outer limit of this jurisprudence-is viewpoint discrimination, particularly when children are mature enough to make an informed decision about the harmful speech.
91
This protectionist jurisprudence imposes clear limits on the state's broad authority to protect minors from harmful speech outside of school. The state can neither interfere with parents' role in raising their children nor protect minors from moral harms. And to justify protectionism, the state must show a causal relationship between the speech and harm to minors, including-for protected speech-means narrowly tailored to protect children from physical or psychological harm. Where there is no harm, or when children actually have the maturity to make an informed decision, the state cannot restrict their rights. Finally, the state cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination even to protect children.
The next Subpart shows how the state's protectionist authority only increases within the context of public schools.
B. Protecting Students from Other Students' Expression
Ever since Tinker, First Amendment rights in school have been "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."
92 Within the school context, courts have only expanded protectionist jurisprudence to shield indifferent residents would not be an invasion of privacy); Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) students from harmful speech. 93 As this Subpart shows, schools used to have very broad authority to discipline students, including by restricting speech, in order to guide their moral development and shield them from harm. Tinker did not so much erode that authority as force schools to reframe it in terms of institutional and individual rights.
94 And post-Tinker cases continued to defer to school authorities even to protect students from moral harm, and even through viewpoint restrictions on student speech.
Prior to Tinker, public schools had almost unlimited authority to impose speech restrictions to instill core values in students.
95 This power arose from the state's in loco parentis authority and the institutional judgment that courts should not micro-manage schools.
96 In this way, protectionism in schools was per se an aid to parental authority.
97 Courts applied a highly deferential "reasonableness" standard to any school regulation restricting speech.
98 One such iteration of the standard was the actual disruption test applied by the U.S. 99. 363 F.2d at 749 (holding that high school regulation prohibiting students from wearing "freedom buttons" which did not disrupt regular school activities was unconstitutional infringement on students' freedom of expression).
by Tinker. 100 Under this test, the threshold for actual disruption was as low as merely distracting another student in class.
101
In permitting students to wear black armbands in silent protest of the Vietnam War, Tinker raised this threshold some, but not by much.
102 Indeed, as Justice Black's dissent in Tinker suggested, Tinker did not so much augur an era of expansive student rights as reframe the prevailing "reasonableness" test 103 in terms of institutional and individual rights limitations on student speech.
104 On the institutional side, schools retained expansive authority to maintain order and discipline under the "substantial disruption" prong taken from Burnside. 105 And on the individual side, student speech could not interfere with others' rights "to be secure and to be let alone."
106
With this last "rights of others" prong, Tinker extended the Burnside rule and thereby folded in latent protectionism. Although Tinker itself did not concern harmful speech, 107 the majority recognized that certain viewpoints might be expressed in a harmful, invasive way, as had occurred in Blackwell v. 101. Waugh v. Miss. Univ., 237 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1915) (upholding state law banning Greek fraternities that "divided the attention of the students and distracted from that singleness of purpose which the State desired to exist in its public educational institutions"); Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748 (noting twice that wearing freedom buttons did not "distract" other students).
102. The school's actions would have been permissible under Burnside since there was "distraction," but not "disruption." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). That Tinker was not as expansive as later critics have portrayed is rightly emphasized in Nuttall, supra note 94, at 1293-302. In this vein, Professor Wright has advocated a shift away from Tinker precisely so that schools can have broad latitude to regulate "distracting" student speech. R. 
Issaquena Country Board of Education only one year prior.
108 Tinker noted with approval that Blackwell had upheld a ban on freedom buttons because students who wore the buttons had "harassed" other unwilling students by trying to pin buttons onto them.
109 Protecting students from this type of invasive speech thus seems to have motivated the Court to create the "rights of others" prong.
110 Just as in Ginsberg, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion offered a different route to the same protectionist end: because minors are like a captive audience, he reasoned, they do not always enjoy full First Amendment rights.
111
Tinker may only have gestured to schools' authority to protect students from harmful speech, but it nevertheless augmented that authority by allowing viewpoint discrimination-defined in Part II.A as the outer limit of protectionism. On this point Tinker was clear: schools can restrict any viewpoint that materially disrupts the classroom or invades the rights of others.
112 Hence, while "an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" could not justify the restriction of an idea, 113 a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption in class or invasion of others' rights could. Subsequent Supreme Court cases expanded Tinker's latent protectionism by carving out alternatives and exceptions to its rule; in so doing, they upheld even viewpoint restrictions in order to protect students from moral, emotional, and physiological harm. Bethel School District v. Fraser, for instance, upheld the punishment of a student for making a nomination speech at a school assembly in a vulgar and offensive manner (the entire speech was a sustained sexual metaphor).
118 Distinguishing Tinker as dealing with political, not sexual speech, Fraser seemed to apply a "reasonableness" standard to the school's actions.
119 Punishing the student was reasonable because the speech disrupted the school's basic educational mission: namely, the "inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system." 120 In the school context, the Fraser Court noted, these values include civilized discourse and being considerate of the sensibilities of other students even when expressing a politically unpopular viewpoint.
121
Fraser justified this highly deferential standard on expansive, protectionist grounds. Citing Ginsberg and Pico, the Court recognized "the obvious concern . . . to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."
122 But in two ways Fraser actually enlarged the protectionist scope of Ginsberg within schools. First, Fraser allowed restriction of more than indecent and obscene speech: vulgar and lewd speech were also fair game. 123 Further, although the Court suggested that the students were a captive audience, the assembly at which Fraser had spoken was not mandatory. it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."), with id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "it was not unreasonable for school officials to conclude that respondent's remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assembly").
120. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). See also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688-89 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Thus, the Court holds that under certain circumstances, high school students may properly be reprimanded for giving a speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted the school's educational mission.").
121. 478 U.S. at 681 ("Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences."). There, a high school principal had censored from the school newspaper two articles discussing teen pregnancy, sexual activity, and birth control.
127
Distinguishing the private speech in Tinker, Hazelwood made an exception for student speech that might "reasonably [be] perceive [d] to bear the imprimatur of the school."
128 Under Hazelwood, when a school is reasonably thought to endorse a speaker, it may engage in content discrimination and perhaps even viewpoint discrimination.
129
As in Fraser, the appropriate standard here was a highly deferential reasonableness standard.
130 And like Fraser, Hazelwood justified this reasonableness standard on protectionist grounds. The majority emphasized that schools cannot be "unduly constrained" in inculcating values in children and "in helping [them] to adjust normally to [their] environment."
131 And, it held, the principal's actions were reasonable in this case: they protected emotionally immature students from sensitive topics like sex and birth control.
132 Yet Hazelwood required no proof of any causal link between the controversial articles and harm to students; rather, it required only that the Pico involved a captive audience, and the school assembly at which Fraser gave his speech was not mandatory. school's assumption of causality be reasonable. 133 In this respect, Hazelwood actually expanded the protectionist scope of Fraser and Ginsberg, for it applied a relaxed causation requirement even outside the realm of sexual speech.
134
Most recently, Morse v. Frederick created another exception to Tinker, this time for student speech advocating illegal drug use.
135 There, a principal had suspended a student who, in a hapless quest for national TV exposure during the Olympic Torch relay, had unfurled a fourteen-foot banner reading, "BONG HiTS [sic] 4 JESUS."
136 Holding that the speech was "school speech"-student speech at a school-sponsored, school-sanctioned event-the Morse majority upheld the suspension because it had been reasonable for the principal to think that the sign promoted illegal drug use.
137 Once again, therefore, the Court applied only a reasonableness standard.
138 And again, restrictions on viewpoint were allowed, albeit for a narrow class of pro-drug speech.
139 In his concurring opinion, which decided the judgment, Justice Alito furthered narrowed the Court's holding so that it did not encompass political and social commentary.
140
Morse notably departed from earlier school speech cases in two respects, both predicated on a Ginsberg-like approach for speech that caused physiological, not moral harm.
141 First, Morse cited an "important-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in deterring drug use among children, which can harm their psychological and physical well-being. 142 The majority supported this interest with a Congressional mandate and extensive documentation of how drugs harm children.
143 By contrast, neither Fraser nor Hazelwood had defined, let alone documented, any actual harm to students.
144
133. See id. ("It was not unreasonable for the principal to have concluded that the frank talk was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen and presumably taken home to be read by students' even younger brothers and sisters."). 134 Second, just as Ginsberg had done, Morse completely relaxed any causal link between speech and harm.
145 Although the majority documented well how drugs harmed children, it simply could not show how the message, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," did the same.
146 It pointed to only aggregative causation at best: a slight causal link between a school-wide norm tolerating drug use and more students doing drugs.
147 Where Fraser and Hazelwood required at least a reasonable assumption that the speech would cause harm, Morse required merely a reasonable inference that a particular message advocated illegal drug use-irrespective of whether or not that message itself was harmful.
Within the special context of the school, then, the state has expansive authority to protect minors from harmful speech. Both Tinker and Morse permit viewpoint discrimination, provided that it can be justified on some other (reasonable) ground. Fraser and Hazelwood enlarged the type of speech that might be deemed harmful to a student audience. And all of the cases relaxed any causation requirement: schools need show only reasonable assumptions, not empirically proven causal links. Parts III and IV will use these insights about protectionism to argue for a more consistent application of protectionist principles to harmful student speech.
III. A PROTECTIONIST APPROACH TO HARMFUL SPEECH IN SCHOOLS
Situating harmful student speech within the broader context of protectionist jurisprudence resolves the questions left open by lower courts in Part I. As Part II examined, protectionist cases already have struck a balance between the Scylla of viewpoint discrimination and the Charybdis of protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.
148 Taking seriously the protectionist purposes of restricting harmful student speech thus clarifies how Tinker should apply to that speech. Specifically, Part III.A shows that, because of their fundamental role in inculcating values and the state's compelling interest in the well-being of minors, schools have augmented authority to protect students from emotionally harmful speech. Part III.B concludes that courts should analyze such speech under Tinker's "rights of others" prong because it is an offensive invasion of students' right to be let alone.
145. Noted most forcefully by Justice Stevens in his dissent. Morse, 551 U.S. at 438-39, 444 (showing that Morse's ban on speech promoting illegal drug use falls well short of proscribable incitement and, regardless, should not apply when the speech does not actually advocate drug use). On Ginsberg's relaxed causation, ramped up by subsequent cases, see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
146. Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.").
147. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (" [S] tudents are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear to tolerate such behavior.") (citation omitted).
148. See supra Part II.
A. Justifications for Protectionism Under Tinker
In light of the special characteristics of the school environment, schools have especially great authority to restrict harmful student viewpoints for three main reasons. First, schools play a fundamental role in inculcating values in students. 149 As Fraser recognized, this basic educational mission encompasses the "habits and manners of civility," including learning to be considerate of other students' sensibilities even when advocating unpopular and controversial views.
150 On this view, restrictions of harmful speech like the Confederate flag or "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27'" may be necessary to foster consideration of the sensibilities of other students.
Second, harmful speech frustrates a school's responsibility to help students adjust to their environment, a proposition that Hazelwood borrowed from Brown v. Board of Education. 151 Central to Brown was the idea that stigmatization prevents just such adjustment and, ultimately, the ability to learn in school.
152 Scholars have shown how speech demeaning of other students, or of race or homosexuality more generally, stigmatizes students profoundly.
153
A third justification for shielding students from such harmful speech is that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of children. As the Harper majority documented, such speech causes students not just stigmatization, but a host of other harms to their psychological and emotional development as well.
154 Victimization tends to result in physical sickness, emotional insecurity, and problems adjusting socially. 155 Consequently, studies have shown that gay and lesbian students, for example, are at greater risk for dropping out of school, 156 depression, 157 and suicide. 158 Although context certainly matters here, 159 the special characteristics of a school may only exacerbate the harm, for a demeaned student's friends can witness the harmful speech, thereby increasing the stigma.
160
Even so, this compelling interest in students' well-being does not justify a Morse-or Fraser-like categorical exception to Tinker for harmful student speech. Professor Waldman recently has argued for just such an exception for "verbal bullying" targeted at other students. 161 On analogy to Morse, she argues, such speech threatens student safety and typically lacks political content.
162 But although Morse documented similar psychological harms to students, its ban on drug advocacy stood "at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits" and was in agreement with longstanding congressional policy to educate students on the harms of drug use.
163 By contrast, emotionally harmful speech-especially anti-gay speech-as yet lacks any such congressional mandate. It also stands far afield from the vulgar and lewd speech restricted under Fraser's expansive rule. Perhaps most importantly, even targeted verbal bullying can have political overtones. 164 For all these reasons, it should fall under Tinker, as Professor Waldman advocates for nontargeted harmful speech.
165
Due to its special characteristics and its protectionist authority, a school can restrict harmful student speech more than other forms of speech. As in the expanded institutional rights and private rights approaches, therefore, some protectionism under Tinker is warranted. But which Tinker prong should apply? To that question Part III.B now turns.
B. Harmful Speech and Tinker's "Rights of Others" Prong
Tinker originally framed its two prongs in terms of institutional rights and private rights limitations on student speech.
166 Which of these prongs is a better 'fit' for the emotional harm caused by, say, anti-gay or racist speech? Some scholars have adopted a Nuxoll-like approach, viewing the harm as an institutional disruption threatening classroom learning as a whole.
167 Others, however, have followed Harper in framing the harm as colliding with the rights of others.
168 This Part shows that protectionist jurisprudence supports Harper's framing: emotionally harmful speech harms students just like offensive speech harms a captive audience.
Nuxoll framed anti-gay speech in terms of institutional rights in part because it had a hard time conceptualizing the T-shirt "Be Happy, Not Gay" as a violation of other students' rights.
169 Although the T-shirt was offensive, the court reasoned, "people do not have a legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or for that matter their way of life." 170 Nuxoll's narrow view of the "rights of others" prong thus forced the court to squeeze harmful speech into Tinker's substantial disruption prong instead. This doctrinal move narrowed the scope of the "rights of others" prong while simultaneously expanding the "substantial disruption" prong to include disruption to a group's right to 165 
172
Scholars adopting Nuxoll's approach have raised a second objection to using the "rights of others" prong: "[t]he substantial disruption language itself already fills the space . . . the students' rights language is meant to fill." 173 Note, again, that this objection is possible only if we expand the "substantial disruption" prong as the Nuxoll court did. At that point, it is true that Harper, at least, repeatedly tied emotional and psychological harm to a student's ability to learn.
Protectionist jurisprudence illuminates how harmful student speech can invade other students' privacy: students in school are (like) a captive audience in need of protection from offensive speech.
178 Courts relying on the "rights of others" prong thus have consistently pointed to the need to shield students from offensive speech.
179 If one student wears a demeaning T-shirt to class, other students sitting behind her must stare at that message throughout class.
180 Just as in the protectionist context, they have no reasonable opportunity to turn away from the offensive speech. And even if they could, the special characteristics of the school environment nevertheless make them like a captive audience in need of protection. Harmful speech becomes amplified within the school context: students quickly recount the speech to their friends; as everyone hears it, a student's shame only grows.
181 As a result, students may develop a distorted perception of school-wide norms that diminishes their ability to internalize harmful speech healthily when they do encounter it.
Harmful student speech in schools thus poses a captive audience problem: schools should be able to protect students who are unwilling audiences from having their privacy invaded by offensive speech. As we have seen, this protectionist justification dovetails well with Tinker's "rights of others" prong. Yet there are nevertheless certain implications for this doctrinal move: if protectionism justifies restrictions on harmful student speech, then it must limit such restrictions as well.
A few questions remain then. Can schools altogether ban harmful viewpoints? If not, what type of harm must a school forecast before it can restrict harmful student speech? And are there any further limitations imposed by protectionism? Part IV will address these questions.
IV. THE LIMITS OF PROTECTIONISM
Part III laid out a protectionist justification for restricting harmful speech in schools. This justification rested on the twin assumptions that such speech is harmful and that students either are, or are like, a captive audience needing protection from unwanted, offensive speech.
182 As Part IV explores, both of these justifications also create implicit limits on a school's ability to restrict harmful viewpoints. Part IV.A argues that a school cannot ban all harmful speech unless it can reasonably forecast some minimum threshold of actual harm, be that from a personally directed insult or a negative political statement within a harmful environment. That conclusion will answer our two final questions on viewpoint restrictions and causality. But even if a school can forecast such harm, Part IV.B argues there are still further limits to its ability to prohibit the speech. Schools can never prevent the voluntary, civil discussion of harmful viewpoints by students who are sufficiently mature or who have parental permission.
A. When Do Harmful Viewpoints Invade the Rights of Others?
Under Tinker, the upper limit on a school's ability to protect students from certain viewpoints is when those viewpoints do not harm other students. But at what point does speech invade another student's rights? At what point does it become harmful? Borrowing from Morse, this Subpart argues that a school can restrict harmful speech so long as it can reasonably forecast harm from either a harmful environment as a whole, or personally directed speech on its own.
Speech in a Hostile Environment
We encountered above the distinction between targeted hate speech-"verbal bullying," as Professor Waldman has termed it-and non-targeted speech that has political overtones.
183 But hate speech need not be targeted to cause lasting emotional and psychological harm. Rather, even non-targeted political commentary that takes a negative view of a particular group can be harmful, especially when it occurs in an already hostile environment.
184 It is the hostile environment as a whole that causes harm.
185
In this respect, non-targeted harmful speech operates much like the prodrug speech in Morse, which contributed to a harmful school-wide norm tolerating drug use.
186 Morse permitted schools to restrict even the mildest speech advocating the use of drugs-"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" included. Likewise, a school should be able to restrict even "tepidly negative" speech if that speech contributes to a school environment hostile to other students. Even though, alone in isolation, such speech would be insufficient to trigger the "rights of others" prong, its contribution to a hostile environment, like ineffectual drug advocacy, is harm enough. Just like in Morse, therefore, a highly relaxed causation requirement would be appropriate with emotionally harmful speech.
187
But where Morse drew a line at banning social and political commentary about drugs, the same should not apply to, say, anti-gay or racist political comments. Social and political commentary about drugs has at best an unclear or de minimis impact on school-wide norms tolerating drug use.
188 Yet even negative political speech about race or sexuality can shame students and contribute to a harmful school environment.
189 As the Harper majority noted, "To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say, necessarily, that gays and lesbians are shameful."
190
So long as a school can point to a hostile environment as a whole, therefore, it can restrict even harmful political commentary.
Reasonable Forecast of Harm
The term "hostile environment," as I use it, need not implicate the standard for peer-to-peer sexual harassment under Title IX as articulated in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education.
191 Indeed, "hostile environment" should not be such a high bar. Whereas Davis determined at what point schools can be held liable for failing to restrict harassing speech, Tinker articulated at what point schools can be held liable for action actually restricting speech.
192
Schools should have some degree of latitude between these two bounds. To give schools only a razor-thin margin for error here would be unworkable at best and catastrophic at worst.
193 At the same time, a school's determination 187. For discussion, see further McCarthy, supra note 20, at 608 (finding that a link to disruption is neither required nor workable for degrading statements that do not identify specific individuals). On this relaxed causation requirement in Morse, see supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
188. If the commentary might reasonably be viewed as endorsing illegal drug use, then a school could ban it even under Justice Alito's controlling concurrence in Morse. To hold otherwise would create absurd results: "Drugs are cool" could be prohibited, but "The United States should change its drug policy because drugs are cool" could not.
189. This is a critical omission in the expanded institutional rights approach in Nuxoll: Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong does not satisfactorily address the aggregate harm of a hostile environment, which can arise even from a mass of "tepidly negative" statements. 194 That would permit banning controversial speech simply because a school disagrees with the viewpoint.
The question, then, is how much deference schools should receive in determining that student speech might be harmful. The Confederate flag cases seem particularly instructive here, for they have adopted a rule similar to a "hostile environment" theory of harm, albeit under Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong. Typically courts have upheld a ban where there had been previous racial tensions at the school.
195 Yet even where there is clear evidence that the Confederate flag had never caused any disruption on its own, courts still have found the bans reasonable because of a history of such tensions.
196
These rulings have given schools broad latitude to ban a symbol with strong political overtones precisely because that symbol could become disruptive in the context of a hostile environment. Only in the absence of both a hostile environment and flag-based physical violence have courts been willing to strike down school bans on the Confederate flag.
197
A similar approach to Tinker's "rights of others" prong would allow a school to restrict speech only if it reasonably perceived that students might be harmed by the speech-for example, through a hostile environment in the school. Two circuits have adopted just such a reasonableness standard for Tinker's "rights of others" prong. The Second Circuit framed its inquiry as a reasonableness test in Trachtman v. Anker, where a school had prevented distribution of a sex questionnaire to students in school.
198 There, the court upheld the school's restriction on speech because there was a reasonable "highly sensitive personal-identity characteristics" even without requiring that the comments be severe or pervasive).
194 probability of "serious emotional harm" resulting from the distribution. 199 Similarly, in Williams v. Eaton, the Tenth Circuit found it reasonable for a state university to prohibit student athletes from wearing black armbands mocking another school's religion.
200 Such a prohibition was reasonable, the court held, because the armbands were hostile to other students' religions-and thus might violate their rights.
201
There are a couple additional reasons to apply a reasonableness standard to a school's determination that student speech would harm other students. First, Tinker's inclusion of a reasonable forecast test was a significant departure from the Fifth Circuit's actual disruption test in Burnside and Blackwell and was intended to balance student speech rights against the rights of schools and other students.
202 To that extent, it would be odd to apply the reasonable forecast test to only one Tinker prong. Inasmuch as both Tinker prongs defined automatically reasonable limitations on student speech rights, it makes sense to include a reasonable forecast test with the "rights of others" prong, too.
203
Second, the same pragmatic reasons that justify a reasonable forecast standard for the "substantial disruption" prong apply equally to the "rights of others" prong. Requiring actual violation of rights would be too stringent a rule-likely resulting in significant disruption to learning-and would require courts to second-guess the fact-specific judgments of local school administrators far too often. 204 Only a reasonable forecast standard, under both Tinker prongs, would maintain courts' traditional deference to schools.
205
For all these reasons, schools should be permitted to restrict harmful viewpoints whenever they reasonably believe that such speech will contribute to an already hostile environment.
Verbal Bullying
Though focused on non-targeted student speech, the above discussion touches on how schools might prohibit targeted hate speech as well. After all, a hostile environment is not the only way for hate speech to harm students: personally directed insults also cause harm. Such ad hominem insults cause more harm than mere teasing, 206 and they do not comport with the habits of civility that schools must inculcate in students. 207 Though they disagree on the exact justification, 208 scholars do agree that schools can ban such "verbal bullying."
209
For two reasons, Tinker's "rights of others" prong supports the general consensus that schools have broad latitude to proscribe personally directed hate speech. First, by its own force, hate speech might cause physiological and psychological harm and thereby invade the rights of other students. 210 As with hostile environment speech, an offensive insult harms students like a captive audience and should therefore be proscribable under the "rights of others" prong.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a reasonable forecast standard already permits schools to prohibit even mere "tepid" insults where those insults reasonably contribute to a hostile environment. Because it is stronger than tepid insults, hate speech would contribute even more to a hostile environment. Adding a reasonable forecast standard to the "rights of others" prong thus permits schools to prohibit verbal bullying, especially within an already hostile environment.
B. When Do Harmful Viewpoints Not Invade the Rights of Others?
The captive audience doctrine also includes certain limits on when offensive speech is proscribable-for example, where the audience is willing or when a minor has sufficient maturity to make an informed decision about the harmful speech.
211 A few additional limits on a school's authority to protect students from harmful viewpoints thus present themselves.
Political Commentary in a Non-Hostile Environment
In Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, a student sued after her high school refused to include her viewpoint-that homosexuality is a sin-on a non-mandatory diversity panel on religion and sexuality.
212 Though analyzing the school's speech under Hazelwood and not Tinker, the district court held that the school's commitment "to provide a safe and supportive environment for gay and lesbian students" was not legitimate in this case. 213 The school had offered no evidence that gay students would be harmed by the speech, a particularly problematic omission because five other panel members would have spoken in support of gays. 214 There also had been "no reports, surveys, or complaints about harassment or victimization because of a student's sexual orientation": this anti-gay speech would have been an isolated occurrence in a non-hostile environment.
215 Just as the school's viewpoint discrimination was not reasonable under Hazelwood, it would have failed under Tinker's "rights of others" prong had a student been speaking instead of the school.
Hansen illustrates that viewpoint discrimination without more than some undifferentiated fear of harm remains the upper limit of protectionism in schools. As with Confederate flags or the anti-gay speech in Hansen, so with all harmful student speech: schools cannot restrict speech simply because it is unpopular or causes discomfort. Schools can, however, restrict student speech that directly harms other students or is reasonably thought to contribute to a hostile environment that causes such harm. Even so, Hansen raises one final question about the limits of protectionism: can schools restrict harmful speech when students voluntarily expose themselves to it? access to harmful speech when they voluntarily sought it out.
216 More broadly still, the state's protectionist authority itself is limited only to aiding parents in raising their children as they see fit.
217 Taken together, these points suggest two further limits to when schools can restrict harmful student speech.
First, a school cannot prevent mature students, or students with their parents' permission, from voluntarily engaging in civil discussion about harmful viewpoints.
218 Bellotti never clearly defined what constituted a "mature" minor: it noted only that the minor must satisfy a court that "she is mature and well enough informed to make an intelligent decision about abortion on her own."
219 Schools are well-equipped to make this kind of determination about a student's maturity, but probably only high school students would qualify. And if parents want to substitute their own judgment for the school's, they can do so under Ginsberg and Entertainment Merchants.
220
Second, this exception would apply only to voluntary civil discussions; it would not give students license to abuse others verbally. By providing an alternative avenue for student expression, this approach thereby obviates Professor Curtis's concern that outright bans on anti-gay viewpoints, say, might drive students to express them in subtler messages like "The Truth Cannot Be Silenced."
221 Nevertheless, given the requirement that students be sufficiently mature or have parental permission, such civil discussions likely would have to be non-mandatory, formal school events. Under these conditions, harmful student speech simply does not pose a captive-audience problem, even if there is an otherwise hostile environment at the school.
222
This exception represents an important limit on a school's ability to engage in viewpoint discrimination. If students want an otherwise harmful viewpoint to be heard, then it is incumbent on them to present it in a responsible way to a 216. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (holding that statute could not require a minor who is mature and well-informed to get parental permission for an abortion); Bd. . By contrast, the approach outlined here would encourage students to express harmful viewpoints in as civil and harmless a fashion as possible.
222. Because the students would be mature enough to exercise their First Amendment capabilities responsibly, there would be no protectionist justification here. After all, the state has no interest in protecting similarly mature adults from harmful viewpoints.
willing audience.
223 If students want to arrange for an optional political debate about race or homosexuality or want to organize their own panel for a nonmandatory diversity day event, they can do so. Hansen's actions were paradigmatic in this regard: she sought to have adults discuss her viewpoint in a civil fashion at a non-mandatory panel that also included pro-gay viewpoints.
224 As the court correctly concluded in that case, the school had no legitimate reason to silence Hansen's viewpoint.
225 Indeed, civil discussions about controversial viewpoints only further the school's basic educational mission to inculcate values of civility, pluralism, and self-government.
CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the justifications for, and consequent limits on, a school's ability to protect students from harmful student speech. Given the special characteristics of the school environment and the nature of the harm caused by such speech, schools wield substantial authority to restrict hate speech and harmful political, social, or religious commentary. So long as a school can reasonably forecast a hostile environment towards other students, it can prohibit harmful speech even with strong political or religious overtones.
The analysis here can and should be applied to all types of harmful student speech, not just to speech about minority groups. Although anti-gay speech, for example, might be particularly damaging to students, 226 any demeaning verbal abuse or a hostile environment more generally can conflict with a school's basic educational mission. Indeed, all students unwillingly subjected to demeaning speech or to an offensive, hostile environment are like a captive audience. Schools have the power to protect them, accordingly.
Of course, this is to say only that schools have the option to do so. Whether a judicially authorized restriction on harmful viewpoints is the best solution is for schools-and especially for students-to decide. I have stressed that despite a school's compelling interest in safeguarding its students, a school cannot fully curb students' access to controversial ideas, though it can require that those ideas be presented in as harmless a manner as possible. Civility may not be required outside of a school, but that does not diminish its fundamental democratic value in protecting every student's well-being. 223 . Such civic responsibility already has pervaded some of the more successful attempts by students to have a responsible climate of speech in schools. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 36, at 490-92 (discussing how, after one school district treated racial controversy as a learning experience by encouraging dialogue, students decided to tolerate both the Confederate flag and Malcolm X insignias); Nadine Strossen 
